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I. ATTACKING “ATTACKS MEET INTERPRETABILITY”
AmI (Attacks meet Interpretability) is an “attribute-steered”
defense [3] to detect [1] adversarial examples [2] on face-
recognition models. By applying interpretability techniques
to a pre-trained neural network, AmI identifies “important”
neurons. It then creates a second augmented neural network
with the same parameters but increases the weight activations
of important neurons. AmI rejects inputs where the original
and augmented neural network disagree.
We find that this defense (presented at at NeurIPS 2018 as
a spotlight paper—the top 3% of submissions) is completely
ineffective, and even defense-oblivious1 attacks reduce the
detection rate to 0% on untargeted attacks. That is, AmI is no
more robust to untargeted attacks than the undefended original
network. Figure 1 contains examples of adversarial examples
that fool the AmI defense. We are incredibly grateful to the
authors for releasing their source code2 which we build on3.
We hope that future work will continue to release source code
by publication time to accelerate progress in this field.
A. Evaluation
We assume familiarity with prior work (specifically [1]–[3]).
Unfortunately, the defense paper [3] does not contain a threat
model or make any specific claims about robustness, making it
difficult to perform a proper security evaluation. The authors,
in personal communication, stated the bound was meant to be
0.01 (3× lower than is in almost all other prior work); this
extremely low distortion bound is never given in the paper.
We generate adversarial examples by completely ignoring the
defense and generating high-confidence adversarial examples
on the original neural network. This approach, while simple,
has proven surprisingly successful in the past when attacking
detection-based defenses [1]. We choose an (incorrect) target
label at random and generate a high-confidence targeted adver-
sarial example for that target using only the original network.
We then test to see if the resulting image happens by chance
to be adversarial on the combined defended model (i.e., is
misclassified the same way by both networks). If it is not (and
would therefore be rejected), we repeat the process and try
again until we succeed. The median number of attempts is 25.
This naı¨ve attack is successful 100% of the time: the detector
has a 0% true-positive rate (lower than the 9.9% false positive
rate); Figure 1 contains successful adversarial examples.
1We mount a defense-oblivious attack because it shows that even under this
incredibly weak threat model the defense is ineffective. (The defense is also
written in Caffe which the author did not want to have to use.) Future defenses
should not argue security only under this threat model.
2https://github.com/AmIAttribute/AmI
3https://github.com/carlini/AmI
Fig. 1. (left) Original images; (right) adversarial examples defeating AmI.
II. CONCLUSION
“Attacks Meet Interpretability” [3] is not robust to untargeted
adversarial examples with `∞ bound 0.01, even when the
attacker is oblivious to existence of the defense. While our
attack is not efficient, we believe an adaptive attack that
specifically targeted the defense would be much more efficient
while remaining 100% successful at evading detection.
We implore researchers who propose defenses to investigate
why attacks fail before declaring a proposed defense effective;
and similarly implore those reading or reviewing papers to
think critically about why the attacks could have failed before
believing the claimed defense results. It is exceptionally easy
to fool oneself when evaluating adversarial example defenses,
and every effort must be taken to ensure that when attacks fail
it is not because attacks have been applied incorrectly.
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